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ost law professors and 
lawyers are convinced that 
the Supreme Court has a 
special capacicy to be guided 
by constitutional values. Professor Ronald 
Dworkin of Oxford and New York 
University Law School described the 
Supreme Court as "an institution that 
calls some issues from the battleground of 
power politics to the forum of principle." 
The Supreme Court "is predestined in 
the long run not only by the thrilling 
tradition of Anglo-American law but also 
by the hard facts of its position in the 
structure of American institutions," 
Professor Henry Hart of Harvard Law 
School agreed, "to be a voice of reason, 
charged with the creative function of 
discerning afresh and of articulating 
and developing impersonal and durable 
principles of constitutional law." Elected 
officials who make the slightest effort to 
limit federal judicial power bring down 
the wrath of a united bar. Lawyers of dif- 
ferent political persuasions do not agree 
on much, but most wax eloquent about 
the virtues of a n  independent judiciary. 
American constitutional history does 
not support these ritual celebrations. 
Everyone lionizes the judicial decision in 
Brown u. Board of Education (1954). A fair 
consensus bas developed that the Supreme 
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Court during the 1950s and 1960s 
improved the quality of constitutional 
justice in the United States by prohibiting 
official school prayer, protecting free 
speech, providing counsel for impecunious 
criminal defendants, and requiring more 
equitable legislative districting. When dis- 
cussion moves from the Warren Court to 
the other 204 years ofAmerican histdry, 
the merits of judicial review and judicial 
independence are less clear. By almost any 
standard, the Court performed worse than 
Congress until 1954 and arguably has 
not performed better (or much better) 
afta 1969. 
Judicial review of federal legislation 
does not appear to have served any noble 
purpose for the first 165 yean of wnstitu- 
tional life. Not one Supreme Court 
decision declaring an important federal 
law unconstitutional in this time period is 
presently thought correct by most scholars 
or informed citizens. More often, a broad 
consensus chastises the justices for striking 
down beneficial policies well within the 
constitutional powers of Congress. Most 
lawyers praise Marbury v. Madiron (1803) 
for justifying judicial review of federal 
legislation, hut few insist that the decision 
declaring unconstitutional an obscure 
section of the Judiciary Act was important 
or wrrect. Almost all lawyers condemn 
Dred Scott v. Sandfird (1836), the next 
instance when the Supreme Court declared 
a federal law unconstiturional. Very 
few law professors have good words for 
Hqburn v. Griiwold (1869). the decision 
declaring that Congress unconstitutionally 
made paper money legal tender during 
the Civil War, Pollock u. Fannm'Loan 
and Trwt Company (1895), the decision 
declaring the federal income tax uncnnsti- 
tutional, and the judicial decisions striking 
down New Deal legislation during the 
1930s. Bolling v. Sbarpe (1954) is the fust 
case in American history in which a 
consensus now exists that the Supreme 
Court correctly declared a federal law 
unconstitutional. 
Whether the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts have demonstrated more 
constitutional fidelity than national elected 
officials is controversial at best. The 
Supreme Court during the Rehnquist 
years declared more federal laws unconsti- 
tutional than at any other time in 
American judicial history. The federal laws 
struck down included affirmative action 
policies, regulations on campaign finance, 
limits on commercial advertising, measures 
expanding religious freedom, restrictions 
on state sovereignty, and efforts to use the 
interstate commerce power to regulate 
non-economic activities. No consensus 
exists as to whether any of these decisions 
was correct. Many conservatives believe 
the Rehnquist Court correctly interpreted 
the Constitution of the United States. 
Liberals disagree. Whatever the constitu- 
tional merits of the decisions, few would 
argue that the Supreme Court in recent 
years has shown special solicitude for 
discrete and powerless minorities, unless 
one regards the Coors Brewing Company 
or persons wishing to spend millions of 
dollars in political campaigns as the most 
unfortunate Americans. 
Readers who question this assessment 
might consider doing a survey using any 
Most scorecards will 
include more cases 
in which the 
Supreme Court 
struck down 
constitutional laws 
than instances when 
the justices voided 
measures. 
constitutional law text commonly assigned 
in undergraduate or law classes. Leave 
out the Warren years and consider only 
Supreme Court decisions declaring federal 
laws unconstitutional or perhaps only 
Supreme Court decisions declaring impor- 
tant federal laws unconstitutional. Most 
scorecards, I suspect, will include more 
cases in which the Supreme Court struck 
down constitutional laws than instances 
when the justices voided unconstitutional 
measures. The survey of decisions declaring 
state laws unconstitutional is likely 
, 
to be more complicated. Still, for evely 
Brown u. Board ofEducation, there is a 
R-igy u. Pennrylvania (1842) holding that 
northern states could not provide statutory 
protections for free residents of color 
accused of being fugitive slaves. 
When thinking about the role of 
courts, lawyers, legal scholars and d t ivns  
should not automatically treat Brown as 
a paradigm and such cases as Dred Scott, 
Hepburn, Pollock and others as anomalies. 
Seen from broader history perspective, 
Brown is far more anomalous than 
Dred Scott. Throughout most of American 
history (and in many new constitutional 
democracies), progressives sought legisla- 
tive victories and played defense in 
court. The Supreme Court, reformers 
understood, was far more likely to declare 
unconstitutional legislative efforts to 
promote political equality than prevent 
elected officials from discriminating 
unjustly Times may change, but a good 
case can be made that, by protecting white 
persons from affirmative action programs 
and affluent Americans from campaign 
finance restrictions, the contemporary 
Supreme Court is merely reverting 
to form. 
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